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RESTORING LIBERALISM TO TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: FROM UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION’S ASHES TO AN AFTERLIFE OF 
MULTILATERAL AVENUES 
Steven S. Nam∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article engages in the recurrent debate over effective transnational 
corporate accountability and offers the first liberalist defense of universal 
jurisdiction’s marginalization in the U.S. court system. Per the U.S. Supreme 
Court, foreign tortfeasors including corporate human rights violators may no 
longer be sued in U.S. courts by their foreign victims via the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) without a sufficient nexus to U.S. territory. Insofar as one motivation of 
ATS defenders was to expand a global human rights regime internalizing 
liberal values, this Article contends that pursuing transnational corporate 
accountability unilaterally through the U.S. judiciary is inconsistent with a 
core tenet of liberalism itself—a state and its constituents should not be subject 
to the external authority of other states. Liberal states duly have protested 
universal jurisdiction over their business enterprises, as well as the indefinite 
long-term “intervention” it poses. 
This Article recommends further development of two alternative avenues 
that encourage multilateral cooperation on transnational corporate 
accountability. The first is inclusive public-private diplomacy convening all 
stakeholders, including non-state actors such as victims’ legal advocates and 
culpable companies. Exemplary were wartime forced labor negotiations led 
by, but hardly restricted to, the American and German governments in 1999, 
which produced a landmark compensation fund for Nazi-era victims despite 
the earlier dismissal of related U.S. class action lawsuits. The second avenue 
 
 ∗ The Author is a Distinguished Practitioner, Center for East Asian Studies, Stanford University. He 
received a B.A. in 2005 from Yale University; a J.D. in 2009 from Columbia University School of Law; a 
M.A. in 2015 from Columbia University, Department of Political Science; was a Visiting Fellow, Columbia 
Business School Center on Japanese Economy and Business (2014); and a Visiting Professor of Law at U.C. 
Davis School of Law (2015–2016). Many thanks to fellow speakers at the 2016 ASIL Roundtable on Business 
& Human Rights for helpful comments and discussions. 
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consists of the widely welcomed U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights and their use by a polycentric constellation of corporate 
accountability NGOs, governments, and business enterprises. The Guiding 
Principles’ legacy remains incomplete, however, as many victims of corporate 
human rights abuses struggle to access concrete remedy; the Accountability 
and Remedy Project under Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights stewardship is intended to address this gap. Ongoing 
development and implementation of these above alternatives presage the 
continuing march towards a coherent global corporate accountability regime 
reliant on cooperation and coordination between stakeholders, rather than on 
extraterritorial unilateralism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The modern chronicle of transnational corporate accountability begins in 
the courtrooms of Nuremberg following the international military tribunal of 
1946. There, from 1947 to 1948, the United States tried before its military 
courts dozens of industrialists from the prominent German companies IG 
Farben, Flick, and Krupp,1 effectively becoming corporate accountability’s 
postwar progenitor. The historic import of these industrialist trials seemingly 
has faded to “a footnote or a passing reminder” that the American purge of the 
Nazi elite went beyond government and military leadership.2 At the time, 
British fears that the industrialist trials would become an ideological boon for 
Communism,3 coupled with an outpouring of criticism from German society at 
the resulting convictions,4 necessitated a strong sense of direction from 
Washington. 
Despite the political need for German industry’s cooperation in 
reconstruction and for its support against the Soviet Union, American 
authorities refused to soften their punitive stance5 as they strived towards a 
liberal postwar international order. Liberalism is the influential political 
philosophy marked by a commitment to the juridical equality and civic rights 
held by citizens, recognition of private property rights, economic decisions 
predominantly shaped by market forces against a backdrop of multilateral 
institutions, and a representative government which derives its authority from a 
consenting electorate.6 It follows that, under liberalism, a state and its 
constituents are subject neither to the external authority of other states nor to 
the internal authority of special prerogatives, such as those held by military 
 
 1 The charges largely stemmed from the companies’ heavy use of slave labor and plundering of 
businesses in German-occupied territories. See generally TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN NUREMBERG (1947). The convictions from a fourth trial before a 
French military tribunal, that of Saar magnate Hermann Roechling and several associates, were reversed on 
appeal in 1949. Grietje Baars, Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? The Hidden Stories Behind the Prosecution of 
Industrialists Post-WWII, in THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 163, 188 (Kevin Jon Heller & 
Gerry Simpson eds., 2013). 
 2 S. JONATHAN WIESEN, WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NAZI PAST 68 (2001). 
 3 TOM BOWER, THE PLEDGE BETRAYED: AMERICA AND BRITAIN AND THE DENAZIFICATION OF POSTWAR 
GERMANY 287–354 (1982). 
 4 WIESEN, supra note 2, at 97. 
 5 Id. at 69, 97. 
 6 Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN POLICY: THEORIES, ACTORS, CASES 
54, 55–56 (Steve Smith et. al. eds., 2012). 
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castes.7 If “the tight network of factories and industries” in the Ruhr Valley 
managed by iron and steel magnates could be broken up, “then Germany, it 
was argued, would be prevented from unleashing another war of aggression.”8 
Accountability and liberalism were found to be intrinsically linked—the notion 
that “failure of accountability signified the failure of liberalization”9 in the 
First World War’s aftermath guarded against U.S. complacency following its 
sequel. 
More than seventy years after World War II’s end, the existence today of 
over one hundred liberal states worldwide10 is a testament to the longstanding 
influence of the United States and its liberal allies. But gone are the days when 
unipolar American dominance could foster liberalization with antithetically 
minimal regard for the liberal guarantee of respect between states. Chief 
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum captured 
this contemporary reality, referencing “recent objections to extraterritorial 
applications of the ATS [Alien Tort Statute] by Canada, Germany, Indonesia, 
Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom” 
along with “diplomatic strife” precipitated by excessive jurisdiction.11 Justice 
Ginsburg, in the opinion for Daimler AG v. Bauman, which was joined by 
seven other justices, furthermore stressed “risks to international comity” 
through the “expansive view of general jurisdiction posed. Other nations do 
not share the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the 
Court of Appeals in this case.”12 At first glance, it would appear that realist 
critics of the ATS had been validated in their criticisms of universal 
jurisdiction over corporations for being welfare-negative to the United States 
politically and economically, endangering its foreign relations as well as trade 
and investment.13 Yet scholarship even through realist lenses has pointed out a 
 
 7 Id. 
 8 WIESEN, supra note 2, at 54. 
 9 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 
2009, 2039 (1997). 
 10 Doyle, supra note 6, at 56. 
 11 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). Per Kiobel, foreign tortfeasors 
including corporate human rights violators may no longer be sued in U.S. courts by their foreign victims via 
the ATS without a sufficient nexus to U.S. territory. Id. The ATS is a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act that 
enables federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions for torts committed in violation of “the law of nations.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 12 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 13 See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN 
TORT STATUTE OF 1789, 14 (2003); Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal 
Incorporation and International Human Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007); Theresa Adamski, 
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dearth of empirical evidence behind the realist approach.14 All the same, ATS 
supporters who sought extraterritorial legal enforcement of human rights 
norms were set back by the preponderance of Supreme Court justices across 
the ideological spectrum weighing against ATS litigation’s judicial 
overreach.15 
Insofar as one motivation of ATS defenders was to expand a global human 
rights regime internalizing liberal values,16 this Article contends that pursuing 
transnational corporate accountability unilaterally through the U.S. judiciary is 
inconsistent with a core tenet of liberalism itself—a state and its constituents 
should not be subject to the external authority of other states.17 In an era in 
which both liberal and illiberal states navigate roads of intertwining trade and 
institutions, transnational companies often function as representative vehicles 
of their respective home countries and of economic interdependence. Even the 
most liberal of states (including stalwart U.S. allies) have duly protested the 
external authority of universal jurisdiction over their business enterprises18 and 
the indefinite long-term “intervention” it poses. 
This Article identifies and recommends the further development of two 
alternative avenues that encourage multilateral cooperation on transnational 
corporate accountability. The first is inclusive public-private diplomacy open 
to all stakeholders, including culpable companies and legal representatives of 
the victims themselves. Wartime forced labor negotiations led by the U.S. and 
German governments in 1999 were exemplary and produced a landmark 
compensation fund for foreign victims after U.S. district courts had dismissed 
as non-justiciable a pair of related class action lawsuits.19 The second avenue 
 
The Alien Tort Claims Act and Corporate Liability: A Threat to the United States’ International Relations, 34 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1502, 1540 (2011); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A 
Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 154–55 (2004). 
 14 See Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1173 
(2011). 
 15 See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 971 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal 
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); Christiana Ochoa, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of International 
Law: Identifying and Defining CIL Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 105 (2005).  
 16 Knowles, supra note 14, at 1137. 
 17 See Doyle, supra note 6, at 55–56. 
 18 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL 
REALITIES 163 (2015); John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien 
Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 8–9 (2009). 
 19 MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS 
72–83 (2003). 
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consists of the widely-welcomed U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (U.N. Guiding Principles or UNGPs)20 and their use by a 
polycentric constellation of corporate accountability NGOs, governments, and 
business enterprises.21 The Guiding Principles’ legacy remains incomplete, 
however, as many victims of corporate human rights abuses struggle to access 
concrete remedies due to practical and legal barriers.22 The Accountability and 
Remedy Project under the stewardship of the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights was established to address this gap.23 Further 
development and implementation of these above alternatives presage the 
continuing march towards a coherent global corporate accountability regime 
reliant on cooperation and coordination between stakeholders, rather than on 
extraterritorial unilateralism. 
I. LIBERALISM’S DISHARMONY WITH UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER 
FOREIGN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 
A. Judicial Unilateralism in an Interdependent Economic Community 
Portrayals of critics and proponents of ATS litigation typically have 
assumed a simple binary—on the one hand, realist cost-benefit analysts who 
criticize the universal jurisdiction of the ATS for endangerment of U.S. foreign 
policy,24 and on the other, advocates drawing from liberalism who conflate its 
use with U.S. leadership in the development of a global human rights regime.25 
 
 20 Office of the High Commissioner of the U.N. Human Rights Council (OHCHR), Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
 21 Applications of the U.N. “Prospect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Special Representative of the 
United Nations Secretary-General for business and human rights (June 30, 2011), https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/applications-of-framework-jun-2011.pdf.  
 22 See, e.g., Katerina Yiannibas, The Removal of Barriers to Access to Remedy for Corporate Related 
Human Rights Abuses in the European Union, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/the-removal-of-barriers-to-access-to-remedy-for-corporate-related-human-rights-abuses-
in-the-european-union (last visited Jan. 21, 2017). 
 23 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy for 
Victims of Business-Related Human Rights Abuse: Explanatory Notes for Guidance, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/32/19/Add.1 (May 12, 2016) [hereinafter Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy: 
Explanatory Notes]. 
 24 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Cleveland, supra note 15, at 971–84; Koh, supra note 15, at 197; Ochoa, supra note 15. For a 
discussion of ATS legislation’s facilitation of “norms entrepreneurs,” or progressive domestic constituencies, 
NGOs, and international institutions that push heightened standards for customary international law, see 
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 
647 (1998).  
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Scholarship empirically assessing the extent to which ATS legislation against 
foreign corporations caused interstate friction has shown that actual U.S. 
foreign policy implications were limited and short-lived.26 Moreover, a 
relatively brief historical record27 does not give credence to the most dire 
realist projections of economic downturns and exacerbated national security 
threats. Nevertheless, the game-changing Kiobel and Bauman decisions 
precluded definitive answers as to whether those realist predictions would have 
materialized over time, or if hindrances to U.S. foreign policy would have 
proven superficial relative to the expected benefits of a strengthened global 
human rights regime. In the wake of Kiobel’s majority opinion, claims against 
foreign business enterprises must “touch and concern the territory of the 
United States,” and “do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritorial application.”28 The Bauman majority opinion was 
backed by eight justices and further entrenched Kiobel, asserting that it 
“rendered plaintiffs’ ATS . . . claims infirm.”29 
In the buildup to Kiobel, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General on Business and Human Rights feared a looming existential threat to 
ATS litigation, “an entire juridical edifice for redressing gross violations of 
human rights.”30 But the decisiveness of what ensued—a categorical rollback 
of the ATS including extraterritorial corporate liability ordered by blunt 
 
 26 See Knowles, supra note 14, at 1173–75. 
 27 The first ATS litigation against a multinational corporation for aiding and abetting human rights 
violations was filed in 1996 by Burmese citizens and human rights groups against the U.S. oil company. 
Unocal. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883–84 (C.D. Cal. 1997). ATS lawsuits targeting foreign 
corporations began arising shortly thereafter. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 
(KMW)(HBP), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23064 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998); Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 221 F. Supp. 
2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 28 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 29 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). Whereas Kiobel limited subject matter 
jurisdiction in transnational human rights cases using the ATS, Bauman limited the ability of courts to assert 
personal general jurisdiction over foreign corporations in transnational cases. Id.  
 30 JOHN RUGGIE, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., KIOBEL AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 6 (2012). 
Kiobel did not apply to every statute authorizing federal human rights litigation. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, State 
Law Claims: The Next Phase of Human Rights Litigation, 108 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 442 (2014) 
(“Although the Second Circuit recently applied Kiobel to reverse a jury verdict on an ATS claim arising in 
Bangladesh, it affirmed the TVPA [Torture Victim Protection Act] judgment based on the same facts. 
Similarly, federal claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and the ‘state 
sponsors of terrorism’ exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act will all continue.”). 
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judicial language, which resurfaced in Bauman31—has raised two questions 
that the conventional realist-versus-liberalist discourse is unable to adequately 
address. Why were liberal stalwarts such as the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and Germany, close U.S. allies that would seem to favor an 
expansive global human rights regime over realist concerns, among the most 
strident critics of universal jurisdiction over their culpable companies?32 
Furthermore, what compelled seven justices across the ideological spectrum to 
join Justice Ginsburg’s Bauman opinion in rejecting the cosmopolitan 
argument that U.S. federal courts have a “strong interest in adjudicating and 
redressing international human rights abuses,”33 without so much as a mention 
of its potential benefits? The denied argument, after all, aligns with the liberal 
state’s fundamental “freedom of the individual . . . the right to be treated and a 
duty to treat others as ethical subjects,”34 a worthy balance for “considerations 
of international rapport” per Bauman.35 
Effective accountability and liberalization are interwoven,36 and gradual 
expansion of the international liberal community is regarded as a preferable 
outcome for liberal states and peoples.37 But to that end, universal jurisdiction 
over foreign business enterprises harbors an inherent paradox. Meant to be 
liberalizing in its aims, as a means it is inconsistent with what liberal 
“democratic peace” theorist Michael W. Doyle deemed “the basic postulate of 
liberal international theory . . . that states have the right to be free from foreign 
intervention.”38 This precept is enshrined in the ideals of the U.N. Charter39 
 
 31 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (“The Ninth Circuit, moreover, paid little heed 
to the risks to international comity its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed. Other nations do not share 
the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case.”).  
 32 See Brief for the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491); Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
 33 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763. See BREYER, supra note 18, at 163 (“[M]any nations have accepted what 
foreign relations law calls ‘universal jurisdiction,’ . . . . This jurisdictional principle, however, most commonly 
applies to criminal prosecutions, not necessarily to civil actions for damages or to instances in which the 
defendant is a corporation.”). 
 34 Doyle, supra note 6, at 55. 
 35 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 763. 
 36 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 37 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 82 (1999). 
 38 Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 213 (1983) 
[hereinafter Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs]. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance 
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and has become a postwar truism despite often being problematic in practice; 
in correlation with citizens’ rights to liberty, the states that democratically 
represent them are entitled to political independence, and “[m]utual respect for 
these rights then becomes the touchstone of international liberal theory.”40 This 
enables the economic strand of liberalism that incentivizes economically 
interdependent states to resolve conflicts peacefully.41 Universal jurisdiction’s 
judicial fiat over foreign companies runs contrary to a multilateral liberal 
framework under which “individuals are free to establish private international 
ties without state interference. Profitable exchanges between merchants . . . 
create a web of mutual advantages and commitments that bolsters sentiments 
of public respect.”42 At the state level, this interdependence of commerce 
shapes “crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies of mutual 
accommodation.” These forums for interactions “ensure by their variety that no 
single conflict sours an entire relationship”43 and buttress a global trade 
network that has encompassed liberal as well as illiberal states. 
There is discordance to universal jurisdiction’s unilateralism with the 
multilateral conduits through which many business enterprises operate. A web 
of cross-border contact has helped sustain the contemporary liberal order.44 
The interdependent benefits of trade are protected by stable expectations, in 
turn.45 Institutions developed to reinforce concepts of expected peacefulness, 
and notwithstanding regular disputes, such as “the European Union, the North 
 
with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) (“No State or group of States has the right to intervene, 
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.”).  
 39 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1.  
 40 Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, supra note 38, at 213. For a leading neoliberal 
authority’s perspective on nonintervention, see JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. & DAVID A. WELCH, UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 209 (9th ed. 2013).  
Nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states is a basic norm of international law. 
Nonintervention is a powerful norm because it affects both order and justice. Order sets a limit on 
chaos. International anarchy—the absence of a higher government—is not the same as chaos if 
basic principles are observed. Sovereignty and nonintervention are two principles that provide 
order in an anarchic world system. At the same time, nonintervention affects justice. States are 
communities of people who deserve the right to develop a common life within their own 
boundaries. Outsiders should respect their sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 41 NYE & WELCH, supra note 40, at 64–65. 
 42 Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, supra note 38, at 213. 
 43 Id. at 231–32. 
 44 Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1151, 1163 (1986) 
[hereinafter Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics]. 
 45 NYE & WELCH, supra note 40, at 67. 
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Organization of American 
States . . . create a culture in which peace is expected and provide forums for 
negotiation.”46 Universal jurisdiction over foreign business enterprises disables 
transnational consultations between state actors, which have increasingly 
welcomed non-state actor involvement, and bypasses intermediary multilateral 
institutions.47 In its extraterritorial push for greater accountability and 
liberalization, it ironically disregards the channels and tools offered by the 
international liberal community, the use of which had become customary. This 
divergence forms the crux of universal jurisdiction’s mismatch with 
transnational corporate accountability and its rejection by many liberal states. 
B. Judicial Unilateralism as a Mode of Intervention 
Where transnational corporations abuse economic interdependence, strict 
adherence to nonintervention despite calamitous failings of oversight by the 
corporations’ home countries can become formalistic to a fault, both ethically 
and pragmatically. The preeminent political philosopher John Rawls asserted 
that “condemnation by the world society” is merited when “domestic 
institutions violate human rights . . . [a] people’s right to independence and 
self-determination is no shield from that condemnation nor even from coercive 
intervention by other peoples in grave cases.”48 But determining when and how 
to engage in an intervention is a challenging task for states, given the tension 
between justice and order49 as well as the array of options available, including 
military force.50 A proportionate response is key to obtaining international 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 See infra Part III. 
 48 RAWLS, supra note 37, at 38. 
 49 NYE & WELCH, supra note 40, at 209. 
 50 For the position of the United Nations on military intervention, see A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, Rep. of the High, transmitted by Letter Dated 1 December 2004 from the Chair of the High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Addressed to the Secretary-General, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004). In the letter, the Chair endorses: 
the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by 
the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide 
and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian 
law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. 
Id. 
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backing. Certainly, disparate categories of human rights violators can warrant 
different types of intervention.51 
Intervention’s acceptance as a contingency tool within the liberal paradigm 
has corresponded with its application in acute human rights crises; Rawls noted 
that the duty of nonintervention would “have to be qualified in the general case 
of . . . grave violations of human rights.”52 Since the 1990s, humanitarian 
interventions of limited duration have been ordered in countries such as 
Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan53 with widespread 
approval from the international liberal community. In contrast, the practice of 
reaching corporate human rights violators via universal jurisdiction and 
punishing them through civil lawsuits has drawn the kind of condemnation 
referenced in Kiobel.54 Realist institutional competence arguments criticizing 
the interference of inexpert and insulated courts on issues with foreign policy 
implications rely heavily on intuition.55 Furthermore, these arguments do not 
adequately account for the instances in which universal jurisdiction was 
employed successfully for non-corporate human rights violators.56 
Universal jurisdiction delegates to a unilateral decision-making judiciary 
without conventional jurisdiction (e.g., U.S. courts) and non-state actors of 
immediate interest (corporate human rights violators, foreign victims, and their 
 
 51 See, e.g., NYE & WELCH, supra note 40, at 211 (“The broad definition of intervention therefore 
includes the whole range of behavior, from not very coercive to highly coercive. The degree of coercion 
involved in intervention is important because it relates to the degree of choice that the local people have, and 
thus the degree of outside curtailment of local autonomy.”). 
 52 RAWLS, supra note 37, at 37. 
 53 NYE & WELCH, supra note 40, at 211–12. 
 54 See supra note 11. Here, we should distinguish the reactions of liberal state actors from those of the 
greater liberal community (including scholars and human rights advocates). The latter of the two groups has 
seen significant support for universal jurisdiction in general. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 15. Yet state actors 
have retained primacy in the liberal framework in theory and in practice, as exhibited by states’ protestations 
that influenced Kiobel. See supra note 10. See also Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in 
International Law, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 199 (2004) (“Liberal theorists . . . understand that 
‘individuals and private groups are political actors of consequence to the development and effectiveness of 
international regimes, but . . . [a]s much as Realism, Liberal IR reifies the territorial state and hews to the 
primacy of states on the international scene.”).  
 55 See, e.g., Knowles, supra note 14, at 1140. The author cautions that “realism-based institutional 
competence assumptions are intuitively very persuasive. That is why they are often simply stated as 
‘traditional . . . understandings’ and persist in court decisions. But they are surprisingly brittle.” Id. 
 56 See generally UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (Stephen Macedo ed., 2006). Note that special tribunals have 
prosecuted criminal cases against individuals for business activities that abetted war crimes. See, e.g., Baars, 
supra note 1. See also Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for Rwanda Dec. 3, 2003). 
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advocates).57 This latter approach often offers compelling justifications 
including limited capacity and/or capability in the courts of the victims’ home 
states, or their questionable impartiality in the face of strong government 
support for foreign investment. But universal jurisdiction over transnational 
business enterprises would require U.S. courts to dictate unilaterally what 
claims should be recognized by foreign states against their own companies.58 
Contrary to its cosmopolitan intent, it could produce new strains of 
international law informed by U.S. domestic legal understandings59 yet dressed 
in universality. As a form of intervention, it would encroach upon foreign 
liberal and illiberal state regimes alike—while giving rise to, in the words of 
Justice Stephen Breyer, “fear of American international law ‘hegemony,’”60—
for an indefinite open-ended duration that has little in the way of recent 
precedent. 
A lack of available standards further complicates relief via U.S. courts, 
bereft of “information and a framework that shapes expectations . . . a sense of 
continuity” built internationally through cooperative liberal institutions.61 
While dismissing four civil lawsuits filed in New Jersey against German 
companies culpable of wartime forced labor, Judge Dickinson Debevoise 
lamented the dearth of comparable domestic case law to guide a judicial ruling, 
although he did write that “[e]very human instinct yearns to remediate in some 
way the immeasurable wrongs inflicted . . .in which corporate Germany 
unquestionably participated.”62 He raised the concern that were his court to 
design “appropriate reparations for the plaintiffs in the present case, it would 
lack any standards to apply. . . . Wrongs were suffered not only by the classes 
of persons represented . . . but also by many other classes of persons in many 
lands.”63 
Shortcomings in the actual execution of universal jurisdiction over foreign 
business enterprises stem from its difficult autonomy, obfuscated by 
cosmopolitan intentions and presentation. For instance, Judge Debevoise 
 
 57 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International Law, in 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 39 (Stephen Macedo, ed. 2006). 
 58 See Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
501 (2000). 
 59 Id. at 505–06.  
 60 BREYER, supra note 18, at 148. 
 61 NYE & WELCH, supra note 40, at 66. 
 62 Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d. 248, 285 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 63 Id. at 284. 
NAM GALLEYSPROOFS 3/20/2017 10:46 AM 
2017] RESTORING LIBERALISM 373 
asked, “what conceivable standard could a single court arrive at a fair 
allocation of resources among all the deserving groups? By what practical 
means could a single court acquire the information needed to fashion such a 
standard?”64 He ultimately referenced the importance of multilateral fora in 
redressing wartime forced labor by German companies, as it “was a task which 
the nations involved sought to perform as they negotiated the Potsdam 
Agreement, the Paris Agreement, the Transition Agreement and the 2 + 4 
Treaty. It would be presumptuous for this court to attempt to do a better job.”65 
His insight was substantiated when the selfsame German wartime forced labor 
issue found resolution away from U.S. courts through decentralized public-
private diplomacy, which is the first of two alternative avenues presented by 
this Article for transnational corporate accountability that reflect liberal 
principles in their means as well as aims. 
II. INCLUSIVE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIPLOMACY IN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. The Settlement Process for Nazi-Era Wartime Forced Labor as a Model 
The politically negotiated settlement agreement redressing the use of forced 
labor by German companies under the Third Reich66 was a watershed for 
transnational corporate accountability. It amounted to ten billion marks, or 
approximately $5.2 billion in December 1999,67 dwarfing later ATS lawsuit 
judgments and settlements.68 The successful negotiations proved instructive in 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 United States-Germany Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the 
Future,” U.S.-F.R.G., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298. For a first-hand account of the German forced labor 
settlement talks in 1999, see STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND 
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II (2004). Eizenstat was U.S. Undersecretary of State at the time 
and a chief negotiator. Id. at 2. 
 67 Carol J. Williams, Germany Pledges $5.2 Billion for Slave Laborers, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 18, 1999), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/dec/18/news/mn-45028. 
 68 See, e.g., Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(entering a $1.5 million ATS jury verdict against defendant holding company for torture); Licea v. Curacao 
Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (entering an $80 million ATS judgment against 
defendant corporation for human trafficking and forced labor); Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, 
Wiwa et al v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., http://www.ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/wiwa-et-al-v-
royal-dutch-petroleum-et-al (last modified Feb. 21, 2012) (announcing defendant corporation accused of 
complicity in human rights abuses including summary execution and torture settled out of court for $15.5 
million).  
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their contrasts with extraterritorial human rights litigation for the following 
reasons. First, on the heels of a multidimensional process wherein all relevant 
stakeholders had direct representation at the table, each party accepted the final 
settlement and lodged no subsequent challenges against its validity (although 
post-settlement disputes arose over peripheral issues such as accrued 
interest).69 Second, the courts allocated the claims money to forced laborers of 
the German companies who were sued in U.S. courts as well as to surviving 
victims of defunct German firms;70 forced laborers not a party to the 
independently dismissed district court civil lawsuits also received 
compensation.71 The fruits of this public-private approach72 arguably 
transcended what was possible with even the most favorable ATS lawsuit 
outcomes against foreign business enterprises. 
Directly influential to the Berlin settlement talks was the rise of “a new, 
decentralized diplomacy” in the two-plus decades since the end of the Cold 
War involving “institutions as varied as businesses, charities . . . advocacy 
organizations, consulting firms, and philanthropic foundations.”73 Such non-
traditional political actors can address governance gaps between potent 
economic forces, actors, and the capacity of societies to hold them 
 
 69 See EIZENSTAT, supra note 66, at 217 (“[I]n a negotiation, a lasting result is more likely to emerge by 
including everyone with a stake in the outcome rather than by freezing out people who may be left resentful. It 
is a way of neutralizing adversaries.”). For a discussion regarding the post-settlement disputes that largely 
were resolved in the forced laborers’ favor, see BAZYLER, supra note 19, at 96–99.  
 70 EIZENSTAT, supra note 66, at 212. Approximately 1.25 million victims received funds from the 
settlement. Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 11, 24–25 (2002). 
 71 Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. 
Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). See Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating The Nazi Labor Claims: The Path 
Not Taken, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503 (2002); BAZYLER, supra note 19, at 78 (“[T]he German government and 
representatives of German industries did not walk away from the bargaining table upon obtaining their legal 
victory. Even if they were now less fearful of American litigation, practical considerations led the Germans to 
press for a global settlement.”). 
 72 See Radu Mares, Decentering Human Rights from the International Order of States: The Alignment 
and Interaction of Transnational Policy Channels, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 195 (2006) 
(“Conceptual treatments of human rights in a less state-centered global order do not seek mistakenly to 
reinforce distinctions such as those between hard and soft law, between legal and nonlegal, private and public, 
territorial and extraterritorial, but to transcend such distinctions with . . . a search for new regulatory 
arrangements to tackle them.”). 
 73 Cameron Munter, Diplomacy Disrupted: Foreign Policy in a Decentralized World, FOREIGN AFF. 
(Mar./Apr. 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2016-02-15/diplomacy-disrupted. 
NAM GALLEYSPROOFS 3/20/2017 10:46 AM 
2017] RESTORING LIBERALISM 375 
accountable.74 Their emergence coincided with the reality that international 
law’s structure typically imposes human rights duties on states that ratify 
treaties rather than on private companies.75 Interests of disaggregated 
governmental and private entities more than ever clash in transnational rather 
than purely domestic political spaces. Without the full participation of 
businesses as well as civil society, a nuanced cross-border matter may never 
wholly be laid to rest. While the Berlin talks’ non-traditional political actors 
nonetheless worked alongside chief negotiators dispatched by the intermediary 
U.S. and German governments, they added multidimensional layers of 
feedback and calibration unavailable to the aborted judicial route.76 For this 
reason, the U.S. camp regarded these actors’ overt participation as critical.77 
Inclusive public-private diplomacy’s “more creative, flexible, and 
democratic” style continues to adapt to the expanding influence of private 
organizations and civil society groups on interstate relations, accommodating 
both advocates and increasingly powerful multinational businesses.78 Its 
process does not depend on the legal protection of human rights in 
relationships between private actors, a tenuous shield only indirectly 
guaranteed through positive state obligations given “liberal concerns with 
preventing public state power from encroaching upon the private sphere of 
individual freedom.”79 Instead, direct negotiations between the concerned 
parties themselves are supported by both state and non-state actors that help 
impose an even playing field.80 In the case of the Berlin talks, state efforts to 
convene the entire range of forced labor victim representatives and the 
culpable companies culminated in a compromise specifically tailored to their 
 
 74 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for 
Business and Human Rights, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
 75 JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 47 (2013) 
[hereinafter RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS]. 
 76 EIZENSTAT, supra note 66, at 217–18. 
 77 Id. Eizenstat describes how the German side was persuaded:  
that to have an enduring agreement all stakeholders needed to be included—the class-action 
lawyers, Eastern European countries whose forced workers had never been paid, the state of 
Israel, and the [Holocaust] Claims Conference, which represented the interests of the Jewish 
slave laborers. This made for a messy and more complex negotiation. . . But in the end I knew it 
would lead to a more satisfying result. 
 78 Munter, supra note 73. 
 79 Daniel Augenstein & Hans Lindahl, Global Human Rights Law and the Boundaries of Statehood, 23 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2006). 
 80 See id. 
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circumstances, which both sides could accept with finality, without relying on 
unilateral judicial dicta.81 
Taking into account the considerable resources allocated by the United 
States and other countries to their international development and trade 
institutions,82 decentralization and inclusiveness have further relevant 
applications. Many multilateral development banks and other state-based 
international financial institutions already feature or are developing 
independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs), these IAMs include 
multidimensional inclusive processes to resolve grievances lodged by 
communities and individuals that have suffered harm from institution-financed 
projects.83 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) followed suit starting in 2000, when the newly established National 
Contact Points of its member states began accepting complaints over 
companies’ non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.84 In turn, civil society input has recommended that the OECD 
“strengthen state commitments to improving availability of remedies for 
victims of corporate abuses rather than merely rely on National Contact Point 
outlets, signifying a continual multi-pronged push towards greater public-
private engagement.”85 
 
 81 See generally EIZENSTAT, supra note 66. 
 82 Such institutions include the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Inter-American Foundation, 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). For data on 
aid distributed through them, see Foreign Aid Dashboard, USAID, https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-
dashboard.html#2015 (last visited Jan. 21, 2017). 
 83 See, e.g., MARK THORUM, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE U.S., 
OIG-INS-15-02, REPORT ON THE PROJECT FINANCING OF SASAN POWER LIMITED, 40–44, 53–54 (2015). See 
also Mares, supra note 72, at 195–96. Mares describes types of “opportunities on which the emerging 
regulatory regime of business and human rights is being built: first, the opening up of state economic channels 
to human rights aspects. . . [and] opportunities to enhance leverage through alignment, complementarity, and 
interaction of policy channels (policy coherence and ‘smart’ policy mixes).” 
 84 List of National Contact Points, OECD, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/ (last visited Jan. 21, 
2017).  
 85 See Caitlin Daniel et al., Remedy Remains Rare: An Analysis of 15 Years of NCP Cases and Their 
Contribution to Improve Access to Remedy for Victims of Corporate Misconduct, ACCOUNTABILITY 
COUNSEL 7 (June 2015), http://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/OECDWATCH_ 
RR_04.pdf. See also Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy: Explanatory Notes, supra note 23. 
(“Furthermore, there will be cases, especially where the human rights impacts are severe, where reference to 
non-judicial remedial mechanisms may not be appropriate or in keeping with State duties to protect against 
business-related human rights abuses.”). 
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B. Restorative Benefits and Caveats Distinct to the New Diplomacy 
While a main objective of inclusive public-private diplomacy in 
transnational corporate accountability is a negotiated settlement whereby 
corporate transgressors provide relief, the “lobbies for mutual 
accommodation”86 that underpin it also offer restorative advantages for both 
sides. A culpable business enterprise is afforded the opportunity to proactively 
improve its reputation, in contrast to scenarios where it must defend against a 
lawsuit or settle out of court pre-judgment for purposes of damage control.87 In 
the years since the breakthrough 1999 settlement, German companies that 
collaborated with the Nazi regime have seen their images markedly restored 
through their perceived willingness to acknowledge and make amends for 
forced labor.88 Meanwhile, their Japanese counterparts continued to suffer 
negative headlines in the absence of a settlement for wartime transgressions, 
along with lingering spillover effects on their products.89 Per the chief U.S. 
negotiator to the Berlin talks, the German companies “had never given much 
credence to the legal case against them. What they really wanted was to 
remove the threat of economic sanctions, boycotts, and other recriminations 
. . . that would haunt them even if they were victorious in court.”90 Moreover, 
the aegis of “legal peace”—dismissal by plaintiffs of any pending Holocaust-
era lawsuits against German corporate defendants—along with the promise of 
U.S. government Statements of Interest to discourage future litigation, was 
prerequisite for the German side and accepted by all parties to the 
negotiations.91 Incorporating legal peace into a conclusive restitution scheme 
closes the door to the never-ending potential for new litigation, as seen in 
 
 86 See Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, supra note 44. 
 87 See id. at 230–31. 
 88 See, e.g., Timothy Webster, Sisyphus in a Coal Mine: Responses to Slave Labor in Japan and the 
United States, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 758 (2006).  
 89 Steven S. Nam, From Individual to Collective Restitution: Recasting Corporate Accountability for 
Korean Forced Labor in the Second World War, 22 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 14 (2015). 
 90 EIZENSTAT, supra note 66, at 246. 
 91 BAZYLER, supra note 19, at 83–84. Regarding the Statement of Interest,  
in any future Holocaust-related litigation against German defendants [it] would (1) inform the 
court handling the litigation that the foreign policy interests of the United States called for the 
recognition of the German Foundation as the exclusive forum for the resolution of disputes over 
the Holocaust-era conduct of German industry and (2) urge the dismissal of the lawsuit ‘on any 
legal ground.’  
Id. at 84. 
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repetitious post-Kiobel iterations of lawsuits against Royal Dutch Shell across 
different fora that continue to this day.92 
Victims of corporate human rights violations and their advocates also 
obtain advantages through inclusive public-private diplomacy unavailable in 
extraterritorial human rights litigation. The Berlin settlement’s transnational 
coverage of wartime forced laborers reached victims across geographic borders 
and provided them a uniform resolution, which separate domestic plaintiff 
classes would have been hard-pressed to achieve.93 Furthermore, such a 
settlement can be structured so that it does not fixate solely on monetary 
compensation for each harmed individual, but rather takes “due account of the 
harm inflicted on groups of people, ethnic groups, and communities[,] . . . and 
incorporates a collective dimension”94 for posterity. Appropriately, the German 
law that created the foundation for distributing settlement compensation began 
with a preamble acknowledging responsibility for corporate abuses under the 
Third Reich and pledging to sustain the memory of the injustices inflicted.95 In 
contrast, corporations entangled in litigation generally are loath to admit any 
sort of responsibility for fear that admission will be used against them in future 
lawsuits.96 A decentralized and inclusive settlement process also precludes the 
possibility of appeals from would-be corporate defendants, avoiding the risk of 
higher courts reversing plaintiff victories and denying redress.  
 
 92 See Shell Faces Fresh Nigeria Pollution Claims in London, VANGUARD (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www. 
vanguardngr.com/2016/03/shell-faces-fresh-nigeria-pollution-claims-in-london/. 
Oil giant Royal Dutch Shell came under renewed scrutiny on Wednesday over its environmental 
record in Nigeria after lawyers brought fresh claims of damage caused by spills to a London 
court. . . . Shell agreed in January 2015 to pay more than $80 million to the Nigerian fishing 
community of Bodo for two serious oil spills in 2008, following a three-year legal battle. . . . A 
Dutch court also ruled in December that four Nigerian farmers demanding compensation and a 
clean-up in four heavily-polluted Niger Delta villages can bring a case against the energy giant in 
the Netherlands. 
Id. 
 93 See Munter, supra note 73.  
 94 Clara Sandoval & Gill Surfleet, Corporations and Redress in Transitional Justice Processes, in 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 93, 106 (Sabine Michalowski ed., 
2013). 
 95 BAZYLER, supra note 19, at 350–51 n.75. 
 96 See, e.g., Shell Settles One Lawsuit But Faces Another, RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE, 
https://www.rnw.org/archive/shell-settles-one-lawsuit-faces-another (last visited Jan. 21, 2017) (Anne van 
Schaik of Friends of the Earth said the settlement is a sign that large oil companies will start to take 
responsibility for the actions of their subsidiaries . . . Shell maintains the allegations are false. The settlement is 
a “humanitarian gesture,” said Shell executive Malcolm Brinded in a press statement). 
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It follows that speedy compensation for victims can be another advantage 
to circumventing judicial proceedings for public-private diplomacy in the quest 
for restitution. While proponents of a binding international treaty or of going 
through Congress to modernize and better delineate domestic laws on 
transnational corporate accountability97 also merit consideration, such 
developments would require extensive deliberations without any guarantee of a 
realizable product. Former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise 
Arbour has noted that dependence on future binding norms “would be frankly 
very ambitious . . . considering how long this would take and how much 
damage could be done in the meantime.”98 The German settlement, for its part, 
resulted in payouts that went out after a shorter period of time than is possible 
under U.S. class action litigation rules.99 
Inclusive public-private diplomacy for transnational corporate 
accountability can even improve relations between participant states by proxy 
of big business. In July 2015, Mitsubishi Materials Corporation issued a formal 
apology at the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Museum of Tolerance for the nearly 
nine hundred U.S. prisoners of war who had been used as slave laborers by its 
predecessor company Mitsubishi Mining Corporation.100 Welcomed by the few 
remaining survivors and victims’ families, the apology was said to have 
strengthened Japan’s alliance with the United States;101 a former advisor to 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in attendance “expressed regret that it had 
taken so long” to deliver.102 In June 2016, Mitsubishi Materials announced an 
initial settlement for thousands of Chinese forced laborers including a formal 
apology and compensation that could total up to fifty-six million dollars 
depending on the number of victims who come forward.103 Described as a 
 
 97 See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 18, at 163–64; Anupam Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: 
Kiobel’s Unexpected Legacy, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 829, 829 (2013).  
 98 Interview Transcript: Louise Arbour, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2008, 7:28 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
720d1cc2-b6f3-11dc-aa38-0000779fd2ac. 
 99 BAZYLER, supra note 19, at 100–01. 
 100 Mariko Lochridge, Mitsubishi Materials Apologizes for Using U.S. POWs as Slave Labor, REUTERS 
(July 20, 2015, 3:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mitsubishimaterials-apology-idUSKCN0P 
U02620150720. 
 101 Japanese Firms and their Wartime Crimes: Mitsubishi Shows Some Remorse, ECONOMIST (July 20, 
2015), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21659467-former-american-prisoners-war-receive-apology-mitsubishi-
mitsubishi-shows-wartime-remorse. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Mitsubishi Materials, Chinese WWII Slave Workers Reach Deal, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 1, 2016, 
9:43 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-mitsubishi-chinese-wwii-slave-workers-settlement-
20160601-story.html. 
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catalyst for improved ties between Beijing and Tokyo, it is seen to have 
increased the likelihood of a bilateral summit in the near future.104 
Inclusive public-private diplomacy is not without its limitations. States 
with poor relations and/or on opposite sides of the liberal-illiberal divide may 
be unwilling to meet at the table over corporate accountability,105 much less 
with their relevant non-state stakeholders in tow. Corporate human rights 
violations can fail to garner the buy-in of influential intermediary 
administrations, which can be seen in the experience of South African 
Apartheid victims adversely impacted by foreign companies’ conduct106 as 
well as that of Korean wartime forced laborers,107 whom the calculus of U.S. 
government interests did not favor. Human rights harms occurring on a smaller 
scale might escape governments’ notice altogether. States also can hinder their 
own image-conscious corporations from moving for reconciliation and redress 
if doing so would clash with their political aims. For instance, the Japanese 
government allegedly opposed Mitsubishi’s desired settlement talks with 
Korean wartime forced laborers on the one hand while sanctioning the 
company’s Chinese forced labor settlement on the other.108 With respect to 
governance gaps in transnational corporate accountability that states refuse to 
fill, the significance of non-state stakeholder contributions is magnified. 
 
 104 Mitsubishi to Compensate Chinese Wartime Laborers, Ignores Korean Victims, DONG-A ILBO (July 
25, 2015), http://english.donga.com/List/3/all/26/411144/1. 
 105 See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preference Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 
INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997) (noting that liberal states tend to have less conflict with each other and enter into 
and comply with legal agreements more often).  
 106 Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). South 
Africa’s government requested the dismissal of a representative ATS lawsuit for “interfering ‘with a foreign 
sovereign’s efforts to address matters in which it has predominant interest,’” while the U.S. government 
asserted that continuing the case would “risk potentially serious adverse consequences for significant interests 
of the United States.” Id. 
 107 John Haberstroh, Note, In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation and Obstacles to 
International Human Rights Claims in U.S. Courts, 10 ASIAN L.J. 253 (2003). Lack of U.S. support was cited 
as a key chilling factor leading to the 2000 and 2001 dismissals of In Re World War II Era Japanese Forced 
Labor Litigation by the Northern District Court of California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, wherein 
wartime forced labor claims were brought by allied POWs, U.S. civilians, and Korean, Chinese, and Filipino 
plaintiffs. Id. 
 108 Moravcsik, supra note 105.  
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III. POLYCENTRIC APPROACHES TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. Proliferation of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights 
Within delineated limits in certain policy domains, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction has proven effectual and expedient. For example, the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 states that the Sherman Act does 
apply to conduct involving foreign trade or commerce when such conduct has 
a direct and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic or import commerce.109 
A comprehensive study on varied uses of extraterritorial jurisdiction,110 
commissioned by John Ruggie before the drafting of his brainchild, the U.N. 
Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, concluded that “multilateral 
measures are likely to be seen as more acceptable than unilateral measures; 
principles-based approaches are less problematic than prescriptive rules-based 
approaches.”111 Unsurprisingly, Ruggie’s U.N. Guiding Principles thrive on 
multilateral, principles-based guidance to transnational corporate 
accountability while eschewing universal jurisdiction’s comparative 
quagmire.112 Their introductory General Principles read as follows: 
These Guiding Principles are grounded in recognition of: (a) States’ 
existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; (b) The role of business enterprises as 
specialized organs of society performing specialized functions, 
required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human 
rights; (c) The need for rights and obligations to be matched to 
appropriate and effective remedies when breached. These Guiding 
Principles apply to all States and to all business enterprises, both 
transnational and others. . . . [They] should be understood as a 
coherent whole and should be read, individually and collectively, in 
terms of their objective of enhancing standards and practices . . . and 
thereby also contributing to a socially sustainable globalization. 
Nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new 
 
 109 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982). 
 110 Jennifer A. Zerk, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights Sphere 
from Six Regulatory Areas (Harv. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. 59, 2010), https://www.hks. 
harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_59_zerk.pdf [hereinafter Zerk, Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction]. 
 111 RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, supra note 75, at 141. 
 112 See id. at 63 (“[A]s a general solution to the overall human rights challenges posed by multinational 
corporations, extraterritorial jurisdiction remains unacceptable to governments.”).  
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international law obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal 
obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under 
international law with regard to human rights.113 
The UNGPs are a rare example of an impactful international “soft law” 
instrument that was not negotiated by national governments themselves.114 
Nonetheless, the U.N. Guiding Principles have gained widespread acceptance 
as a normative reference point for public actors such as states, state-created 
institutions, and the United Nations in addition to private actors such as 
corporations and NGOs.115 Departing from conventional perceptions of 
adversarial relationships between states, businesses, and civil society, the 
UNGPs herald a “polycentric governance” for corporate accountability that 
depends on the coordinated efforts of all three groups to prevent, navigate, and 
redress corporate human rights violations.116 Even as they become increasingly 
accepted by the global liberal community for their emphasis on improving 
multilateral grievance mechanisms and voluntary initiatives (unlike the ATS 
lawsuits that threatened universal jurisdiction over corporations),117 the 
UNGPs and their promise are predicated on a continuing transnational 
evolution of the traditional liberal framework. Conventional liberalism views 
non-state actors as influential yet functional at the international level only 
through the state agents allocated to them, an arrangement manifest in 
 
 113 Guiding Principles, supra note 20, at 1. 
 114 John Ruggie, Professor, Harvard Kennedy School, Address at the Raymond and Beverly Sackler 
Distinguished Lecture: Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (Feb. 28, 2013) 
[hereinafter Ruggie, Address]. 
 115 Id. (“The Guiding Principles’ core features have been incorporated by numerous other international 
and national standard setting bodies. International business associations and labor federations have issued 
user’s guides to the Guiding Principles, and civil society groups invoke them in their work. The number of 
companies developing human rights-related policies and practices is increasing impressively.”). 
 116 Id.  
For states, the focus is on the legal obligations they have under the international human rights 
regime to protect human rights abuses by third parties, including business, as well as policy 
rationales that are consistent with, and supportive of, meeting those obligations. For businesses, 
beyond compliance with legal obligations that may vary across countries . . . the Guiding 
Principles focus on the need to manage the risk of involvement in human rights abuses, which 
requires acting with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others, and to address harm 
where it does occur. For affected individuals and communities, the Guiding Principles provide a 
basis for the further realization of their right to remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.  
Id. 
 117 See Knowles, supra note 14, at 1176 (“[I]s the ATS nonetheless a counterproductive means of 
achieving cooperation regarding human rights because it interferes with efforts by international legal 
institutions to develop human rights law?”).  
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inclusive public-private diplomacy; the prospect of non-state actors’ own 
transnational agency is left unconsidered.118 Peter Spiro helpfully characterizes 
this shift with respect to the United States as follows: 
Existing models of international law and international relations are 
ill-equipped to project the more complete assimilation of the United 
States into international norm regimes. On the one hand, norm-driven 
theories fail to explain how international actors will overcome 
entrenched U.S. resistance to international lawmaking . . . . On the 
other hand, rationalist theories systematically underestimate the 
incentives that the United States may have for buying into 
international regimes. By segregating interests and actors along 
national lines, these models miss transnational accelerants of 
international norms . . . . Transnationality affords non-domestic 
actors enhanced leverage in pressing U.S. participation in 
international regimes.119 
In practice, corporate accountability NGOs have regularly pierced the veil 
of statehood. Unconstrained by a state-hegemonic concept of international 
human rights law120 and with their newfound tool of UNGP standards, NGOs 
pressure transnational business enterprises to improve self-enforcement 
mechanisms for human rights due diligence.121 NGOs can skirt the respect for 
sovereignty that binds the global liberal community when pressing for changes 
to domestic and foreign state institutions’ accountability policies, often with 
reference to the UNGPs—which provide a needed “authoritative focal point 
around which the expectations and behavior of the relevant actors can 
converge.”122 In a recent joint letter to the Chairman and President of the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States both praising and offering 
 
 118 Spiro, supra note 54, at 199. 
 119 Id. at 218.  
 120 See Mares, supra note 72, at 197 (“[T]he possibility for law to reassert itself globally through the 
intrafirm channel, allowing endless combinations of public regulation, private regulation, standardization and 
capacity-building measures involving a multitude of policy channels.”).  
 121 See, e.g., TIM STEINWEG ET AL., CTR. FOR RES ON MULTINATIONAL CORP., CUT AND RUN: UPDATE ON 
THE IMPACT OF BUCHANAN RENEWABLES’ OPERATIONS AND VATTENFALL’S DIVESTMENT 61 (2013), 
https://www.somo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Cut-and-Run.pdf (“[I]nternationally accepted standards 
such as the OECD Guidelines or the U.N. Guiding Principles also insist on proper human rights due 
diligence.”). 
 122 RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, supra note 75, at 78 (“One reason that existing initiatives, public and private, 
do not add up to a more coherent system capable of truly moving markets is the lack of an authoritative focal 
point around which the expectations and behavior of the relevant actors can converge. Thus, my immediate 
objective was to develop and obtain agreement on a normative framework and corresponding policy guidance 
for the business and human rights domain, establishing both its parameters and its perimeters.”). 
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recommendations for its grievance mechanism development, forty-one leading 
domestic and international NGOs and advocates highlighted the UNGPs’ non-
judicial mechanism effectiveness criteria.123 In so doing, the letter detailed the 
ways to measure a mechanism’s efficacy including legitimacy, accessibility, 
predictability, equitability, and transparency, among others.124 The Export-
Import Bank’s grievance mechanism is intended to handle claims from 
individuals and communities harmed by overseas Bank-funded corporate 
projects;125 hence in polycentric fashion, civil society input for domestic 
institutions as informed by the UNGPs can reach transnational corporate 
activity and heighten accountability standards without disrupting state 
sovereignty. 
States also benefit from the permeation of UNGPs in the governance 
structures of representative global institutions, especially with respect to the 
UNGPs’ universality and clarity. Many of the multilateral, principles-based 
concepts have been integrated into a panoply of institutional language, from 
the human rights chapter of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, to provisions in the new funding standards for the International 
Finance Corporation, to the social responsibility standard issued by the 
International Standards Organization.126 By conditioning project approval 
and/or funding on compliance with the UNGPs, states and their institutions are 
better able to avoid situations where they become implicated in overseas 
corporate abuse resulting from their financial and/or promotional support of 
culpable firms. A liberal home state’s call for adherence to UNGP guidance 
among its business enterprises also can translate into “much-needed support to 
host states that lack the capacity to implement fully and effectively regulatory 
environments on their own.”127 In the long-term, an increasingly uniform 
regulatory playing field worldwide should reduce costs for states and their 
transnational businesses, which have been navigating disparate patchworks of 
regulatory regimes across different host governments. 
 
 123 Letter from Accountability Counsel et al. to Fred Hochberg, Chairman and President, Exp.-Imp. Bank 
of the U.S. (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/1.4.15-Ex-Im-
Grievance-Mechanism-Sign-on-Letter.pdf. 
 124 Id.  
 125 Id. 
 126 Ruggie, Address, supra note 114, at 8–9. 
 127 RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, supra note 75, at 85. 
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In the view of the UNGPs, business enterprises too are crucial proactive 
actors, rather than mere recipients, of the carrot and stick approach. For 
instance, their participation is key to multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), or 
industry-wide initiatives designed by a polycentric and transnational array of 
government, corporate, and civil stakeholders to encourage voluntary standards 
and verification schemes.128 The UNGPs note that in complex operating 
contexts, business enterprises would do well not only to engage with “expertise 
and cross-functional consultation within the enterprise, but also to consult 
externally with credible, independent experts, including . . . multi-stakeholder 
initiatives”129 found in their respective industries. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI)130 is a prominent example of a functioning MSI 
that, while subject to ongoing constructive criticism from civil society,131 has 
seen its global membership and credibility grow among liberal states.132 EITI 
invites greater scrutiny and concurrent accountability into the once largely 
opaque extractive industries sector. Overseen by a polycentric and 
international board on which sit individuals from the corporate and civil 
society spheres as well as government representatives,133 EITI is one among a 
 
 128 Guiding Principles, supra note 20, at 31. 
 129 Id. at 26. See Peter Utting, Regulating Business Via Multistakeholder Intitiatives: A Preliminary 
Assessment, in VOLUNTARY APPROACHES TO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS AND A RESOURCE 
GUIDE (2002).  
 130 See Who We Are, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/about/who-we-are 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2017) (describing EITI as “a global Standard to promote open and accountable 
management of natural resources . . . . In each of the implementing countries, the EITI is supported by a 
coalition of governments, companies and civil society.”); EITI Fact Sheet, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. 
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/eiti_factsheet_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 
21, 2017) (“Countries implementing the EITI disclose information on tax payments, licenses, contracts, 
production and other key elements around resource extraction . . . . A country’s EITI Report informs the public 
of what happens with its natural resources . . . .”) One of the requirements of the EITI Reports is that they “are 
comprehensible, actively promoted, publicly accessibly, and contribute to public debate.” Id. 
 131 See, e.g., MSI INTEGRITY, PROTECTING THE CORNERSTONE: ASSESSING THE GOVERNANCE OF 
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE MULTI-STAKEHOLDER GROUPS (2015), http://www.msi-
integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MSI-Integrity-Protecting-The-Cornerstone-Report.pdf. 
 132 See Frequently Asked Questions, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, 
https://eiti.org/FAQ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017) (“An increasing number of OECD countries have begun 
implementing the EITI. When the EITI was launched in 2002, the objective was to tackle the ‘resource curse.’ 
The global transparency movement has come a long way since then, and so have the perceived benefits. . . . 
Norway decided to implement because it sees the EITI as part and parcel of its broader commitment to 
transparent public finances. The United States committed to implement the EITI to ‘help guarantee the 
taxpayer a full and fair return from their resources.’ Australia and Germany are piloting the EITI and UK and 
France have also committed . . . .”). 
 133 See The ETI Board, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/about/board 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2017). 
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growing number of MSIs, each adapted to the distinct particulars and 
circumstances of a given industry. These MSIs share the common objective of 
incentivizing every stakeholder to cooperate for their respective economic, 
reputational, ethical, and moral interests. To the extent a MSI’s legitimacy is 
strengthened via polycentric feedback and checks, it can counteract adversarial 
zero-sum attitudes over transnational corporate accountability within its 
pertinent industry. 
B. Joint Development and Implementation of the Accountability and Remedy 
Project 
Notwithstanding the liberal community’s expanding reliance on the U.N. 
Guiding Principles, there are still no widespread and effective state-based 
judicial mechanisms that ensure access to remedy for transnational corporate 
human rights abuses, a main pillar of the UNGPs. Under a mandate from the 
Human Rights Council, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights launched the Accountability and Remedy Project (the 
Project) in November 2014,134 requesting and receiving input from a wide 
range of state, corporate, and NGO stakeholder groups. The Project 
commissioned an independent study and received feedback in the form of 
submissions from a wide variety of state and private actors.135 The Project 
accorded the submissions balanced consideration, finding that better enabling 
access to remedy in practice will require “concerted and multifaceted efforts 
from all states. . . and closer international cooperation,”136 especially with 
respect to challenges “exacerbated in cross-border cases.”137 
Improved state-based judicial mechanisms for victims in transnational 
cases would address two problem areas. First, awareness and effective use of 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms at the disposal of workers and affected 
 
 134 Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy: Explanatory Notes, supra note 23. 
 135 JENNIFER ZERK, OHCHR, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCESS 
TO REMEDY 2–3 (2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/ 
RemedyProject1.pdf. Submissions came from States, the United States, the European Union, the International 
Organisation of Employers, leading corporate accountability NGOs such as the Centre for Research on 
Multinational Corporations (SOMO) and the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR), 
attorneys and law firms, academia, and NPOs working in the field of business and human rights. 
 136 Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy: Explanatory Notes, supra note 23, at ¶ 7. 
 137 Id. at ¶ 5. A “cross-border” case is defined as “one where the relevant facts have taken place in, the 
relevant actors are located in order the evidence needed to prove a case is located in more than one State.” Id. 
at Box 3.  
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communities continue to lag despite the assistance of NGOs worldwide;138 
many fear that such mechanisms “reflect the power imbalance between 
companies and rights-holders and . . . might become substitutes for judicial 
processes.”139 Second, existing domestic legal regimes tend to focus on 
business activities and impacts within their own territories, leaving their 
systems undeveloped for redressing transnational corporate human rights 
abuses.140 Domestic pathways whereby states could “strengthen judicial 
capacity to hear complaints and enforce remedies against all corporations 
operating or based in their territory, while also protecting against frivolous 
claims,”141 was suggested years before the UNGPs’ advent, yet can hardly be 
implemented in a unilateral vacuum with respect to cross-border cases. The 
impediments to extraterritorial jurisdiction over business enterprises assessed 
in this Article, coupled with its perennial and troublesome requirement of 
“reasonableness,”142 have necessitated greater coordination between countries 
for transnational judicial mechanisms that are complementary to the extent 
possible. 
Bolstered by polycentric input and its accompanying legitimacy, the 
Accountability and Remedy Project has provided guidance for “cross-border 
cooperation between relevant State agencies and judicial bodies, tailored to the 
contexts of both public law enforcement and private law claims.”143 Realistic 
in scope, it takes care to note the following granular and constructivist 
considerations: 
 
 138 See, e.g., COLLEEN FREEMAN & ESTHER DE HAAN, CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS, USING GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS: ACCESSIBILITY, PREDICTABILITY, LEGITIMACY AND 
WORKERS’ COMPLAINT EXPERIENCES IN THE ELECTRONICS SECTOR 4–5 (Mar. 2014), https://www.somo.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Using-Grievance-Mechanisms.pdf; GWYNNE SKINNER ET AL., CORE, THE THIRD 
PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 60–
61 (Dec. 2013), http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/The-Third-Pillar.pdf.  
 139 RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, supra note 75, at 121. 
 140 Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy: Explanatory Notes, supra note 23, ¶ 5. 
 141 John Ruggie (Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises), Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights 
¶ 91, U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
 142 Zerk, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 110, at 10 (“International law places limits on the use of 
direct extraterritorial jurisdiction. As well as having to rely on one or more established jurisdictional principles 
(i.e. relevant territorial connections, nationality connections, or the more controversial passive personality, 
protective or universality principles), it is generally agreed that the use of direct extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
subject to an overarching ‘reasonableness’ requirement. This requirement is only vaguely defined in 
international legal discourse.”). 
 143 Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy: Explanatory Notes, supra note 23, ¶ 28. 
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There are many differences between jurisdictions in terms of legal 
structures, cultures, traditions, resources and stages of development, 
all of which have implications for the issues covered by the guidance. 
For instance, some legal systems are highly codified, whereas others 
place more reliance on legal development through judicial decisions 
and precedent. Some domestic legal systems are adversarial, whereas 
others are inquisitorial, and some contain elements of both. Some 
legal systems are federal, or devolved in nature, whereas others are 
unitary. Some legal systems provide for corporate criminal liability, 
and some do not. The guidance is therefore necessarily flexible and 
anticipates the need for adaptation to local needs and contexts. 
Identifying areas where improvement is needed in domestic legal 
regimes may be a complex task, and in some jurisdictions a formal 
legal review may be necessary.144 
The Project’s recommendations include: (1) facilitating “detection, 
investigation, prosecution, and enforcement of cross-border cases concerning 
business involvement in severe human rights abuses,” (2) using new normative 
frameworks in which requests for interstate legal assistance and collaboration 
are recognized under “appropriate bilateral and multilateral arrangements,” and 
(3) carrying out transnational investigations by using joint investigation 
teams.145 Whereas universal jurisdiction threatened to force unilateral 
judgments upon the business enterprises of ill-disposed states, the Project 
envisions mutually negotiated agreements and initiatives banding together 
states’ domestic judicial mechanisms for rapid responses.146 It also admonishes 
negotiating states to recognize “patterns of inward and outward foreign direct 
investment,”147 so as to avoid self-interested biases and favoritism, and for 
judicial bodies to impose appropriate restitution upon companies that take into 
account their human rights due diligence148 (reflecting the input from 
businesses that went into the Project’s development). Further recommendations 
range from accessible information repositories for points of contact and 
outstanding requests, to the involvement of judicial and enforcement agency 
personnel in multilateral networks for exchange of know-how.149 International 
 
 144 Id. ¶ 5.  
 145 Id. ¶¶ 9, 9.2–9.3. 
 146 See id. 
 147 Id. ¶ 9.7. 
 148 Id. ¶ 11.2. 
 149 Id. ¶¶ 9.5–9.6. 
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arrangements in law enforcement already incorporate many such collaborative 
elements, but their extension to relevant judicial bodies has little precedent.150 
More radical concepts for judicial mechanisms involving binding legal 
instruments, e.g., the creation of a new jurisdiction over business enterprises, 
are generally prone to a lack of self-agency and/or assured high-level 
representation for participant state and non-state stakeholders, rendering them 
impractical for purposes of adoption. Additional ideas discussed at the 2016 
American Society of International Law Roundtable on Business & Human 
Rights included: (1) national mechanisms overseen by regional human rights 
commissioners (appointed by the U.N. Human Rights Commission or regional 
human rights courts where applicable), (2) specialized permanent tribunals at a 
regional level with harmonization across tribunals and judges from existing 
regional human rights courts, (3) extending the Rome Statute in the 
International Criminal Court to apply to corporate, as well as natural persons, 
or (4) a corporate human rights chamber based at the International Court of 
Justice in the Hague. The greater the degree of polycentric elements introduced 
into the development and implementation of these proposals, the greater will 
be their chances for coming to fruition someday. 
Tapping into the liberal internationalism characteristic of the synergistic 
UNGPs, the Accountability and Remedy Project calls for state-based judicial 
mechanisms to transcend together the conventional bounds of comity with 
respect to transnational corporate abuses. Its proactive cross-border 
coordination is intended to shape mutually acceptable resolutions ending in 
concrete remedy. Whether the Project can gain the kind of polycentric traction 
enjoyed by the UNGPs remains to be seen. Its success would represent the 
latest contribution to a nascent and coherent global corporate accountability 
regime driven by stakeholder cooperation, as opposed to extraterritorial 
unilateralism. 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as this Article has traced the evolving relationship between 
liberalism and transnational corporate accountability, the place of illiberal 
regimes within a broader discourse cannot be discounted. Most developing 
economies are rarely in a position to turn away, for ideological reasons alone, 
 
 150 See id. ¶ 7. 
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investment by foreign business enterprises that hail from states with autocratic 
governments. Illiberal China is not only a significant driver of the global 
economy, but has also founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB)—an international financial institution joined by numerous liberal and 
illiberal states alike.151 Indeed, the United States and Japan have been roundly 
criticized for refusing to follow China’s lead and rejecting membership in the 
AIIB,152 thereby losing the opportunity to exercise a liberalizing influence 
from the inside. Going forward, should we expect transnational business 
enterprises from illiberal states to respect human rights abroad despite tenuous 
government regard for human rights at home? 
There is cause for optimism in free-market capitalism’s invisible hand, the 
ubiquitous workings of which semi-planned economies such as China’s cannot 
avoid while targeting continued expansion. Ruggie has noted that Chinese 
companies operating within the Global South recently “have begun to 
encounter resistance from local communities and other stakeholders that are 
empowered and mobilized by the very social norms that have built up around 
their European and North American counterparts.”153 In effect, if gradually 
higher standards are demanded by host communities as well as host states, 
respect for higher corporate accountability benchmarks becomes less of a 
prerogative and more of a competitive necessity for illiberal states and their 
businesses. While rule of law with regards to transnational corporate 
accountability remains a patchwork across liberal and illiberal states, the 
emergence of a “rule of norms” certainly appears underway. 
Immanuel Kant, a forefather of liberalism and visionary of a cosmopolitan 
and just “universal civil society,” envisioned it combining “the greatest 
freedom, and thus thoroughgoing antagonism among its members, with a 
precise determination and protection of the boundaries of this freedom, so that 
 
 151 See, e.g., Andrea Thomas & Charles Hutzler, Germany, France, Italy to Join China-Backed 
Development Bank, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-france-italy-to-
join-china-backed-development-bank-1426597078; Egypt, Norway, Russia Approved as AIIB founders, CHINA 
DAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-04/15/content_20437814.htm (last updated Apr. 15, 
2015); Iran Joins China-Led Asian Bank, FARS NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 7, 2015), http://en.farsnews.com/ 
newstext.aspx?nn=13940118001336. 
 152 See, e.g., Gerald L. Curtis, Keynote Speech at Columbia Business School’s Center on Japanese 
Economy and Business 30th Anniversary Conference: The United States and Japan in a Turbulent Asia (May 
13, 2016), http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/cjeb/sites/cjeb/files/Gerald%20L.%20Curtis%E2%80%99s%20 
Keynote%20Speech%20%E2%80%9CThe%20US%20and%20Japan%20in%20a%20Turbulent%20Asia%E2
%80%9D.pdf. 
 153 RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, supra note 75, at 94. 
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it can coexist with the freedom of others.”154 Healthy internal debate and 
frictions would be considered only natural given humanity’s proclivity towards 
unrestricted freedom. However, mutual respect for each other’s boundaries in 
the vein of liberalism would help form a greater whole and reduce distractions 
from “the highest attainable development of mankind’s capacities.”155 The lack 
of this reciprocal respect doomed universal jurisdiction over foreign business 
enterprises, which despite noble intentions was an exercise in forcing 
cosmopolitanism before its time. When transnational corporate accountability 
is left to the unilateral and extraterritorial fiat of courts, the end result for 
stakeholders is not unlike Kant’s figurative lone trees “that grow in freedom 
and separate from one another . . . and are stunted, bent, and twisted.”156 When 
accountability instead is ceded in polycentric fashion to governments, civil 
society, and business enterprises, their resemblance to Kant’s “trees in a 
forest”—“which need each other, for in seeking to take the air and sunlight 
from the others, each obtains a beautiful, straight shape”157—grows inexorably. 
 
 154 IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 33 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Publ’g 
Co. 1983) (1784). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id.  
 157 Id. 
